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Public Participation In
International Processes:
Environmental Case Studies at the
National and International Levels
David A. Wirth'
I. INTRODUCTION
The environment is now a highly productive area of concerted interna-
tional activity. In recent years many environmental issues, such as
stratospheric ozone depletion and exports of hazardous wastes, have be-
come "internationalized" through shifts from domestic to international fora.
Other environmental problems, such as the greenhouse effect, have been
taken up in multilateral settings in the first instance, before any obvious
prior domestic analogue was in place. Certainly this trend toward multilat-
eral treatment of international environmental problems has much to
recommend it. Multilateral agreements present opportunities to craft com-
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prehensive, effective, efficient regimes that are widely acknowledged as es-
tablishing international standards by a large number of countries and that
minimize competitive disadvantages among them.
But on the international level, the primary, if not sole, actors are sover-
eign states as represented by their governments. In strong contrast to domestic
processes, nonstate actors'-such as individuals, trade associations, and
public interest organizations--often have rights that often are either nonex-
istent or poorly defined in multilateral fora. As a consequence, the otherwise
desirable "internationalization" of environmental issues may provoke sig-
nificant disparities between the treatment of similar or identical subject matter
in domestic and international processes, most notably as those processes
relate to the public. The greatest potential for clashes occurs on subject
matter that is, or may be, the target of domestic requirements and that is
treated sequentially or concurrently in both domestic and international fora.
Multilateral treaty negotiations-the principal venue for establishing
international and, increasingly, domestic standards for environmental pro-
tection-are an obvious example of the potential for divergence between
domestic and international procedures. The Congress, our national legisla-
ture, customarily publishes proposals for legislation, and that body's hearings
and deliberations are ordinarily open to the public.2 Similar requirements
accompany the quasi-legislative function of promulgating regulations by
the Executive Branch, which at a minimum must give public notice of pro-
posed regulations, invite public comment on those proposals, and respond
to public input in a final regulation.' Indeed, we are accustomed to thinking
of public access to the workings of government as essential to the demo-
cratic process. But in multilateral treaty negotiations, where nongovernmental
1. Unless the context requires otherwise, in this article terms such as "nonstate
actor," "the public," "the private sector," and "private party" refer without distinction to
any nongovernmental entity, including but not limited to individuals, nongovernmental
environmental organizations, businesspersons, scientists, and media representatives.
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its
Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in
their Judgment may require Secrecy"); 44 U.S.C. §§ 901-10 (specifying publication re-
quirements for Congressional Record); Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule
I(9)(b)(1) & (9)(b)(2), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (The Speaker of the House shall
"devise and implement a system subject to his direction and control for complete and
unedited audio and visual broadcasting and recording of the proceedings of the House of
Representatives. He shall provide for the distribution of such broadcasts and recordings
thereof to news media .... All television and radio broadcasting stations, networks,
services, and systems (including cable systems) which are accredited to the House radio
and television correspondents' galleries . . . shall be provided access to the live coverage
of the House of Representatives.").
3. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (notice and
comment rule making) [hereinafter APA].
[Vol. 7:1
Public Participation in International Processes
"observers" may be excluded from drafting sessions and interim negotiating
texts may be unavailable to the public, such guarantees are not to be taken
for granted.
A related but distinct question concerns public participation in domes-
tic processes that arise in a foreign policy setting. The Constitution assigns
the President, the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations," and the
Executive Branch which he heads, exclusive authority to negotiate interna-
tional agreements on behalf of the United States (US). Those negotiations
are vehicles for defining law simultaneously on both the international and
domestic levels. Indeed, after the Senate gives its advice and consent by a
two-thirds majority, a treaty has the same status in domestic law as a stat-
ute.5 But the process of defining international commitments, which are
determined in the first instance by the Executive Branch, differs consider-
ably from that for domestic statutes enacted by the Congress. In contrast to
the open, public procedure customarily followed by the Congress, interna-
tional negotiations undertaken by the Executive Branch are often conducted
in secret by agencies like the Department of State which have the authority
to withhold important documents, such as negotiating drafts, from the pub-
lic.,
Executive Branch activities on many domestic environmental issues
are strictly regulated by clear, legislatively established requirements. Most
administrative rule making must be accompanied by well-defined proce-
dural guarantees, including publication of a proposed regulation in the
Federal Register, an opportunity for public comment on that proposal, and
a response to public comments in promulgating the final rule. By contrast,
there has been little attempt at establishing statutory standards for the con-
duct of international negotiations, including those pertaining to the
environment. Indeed, the principal legal authority on this point, the Admin-
4. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
5. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution, a
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legisla-
tion."); I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
6. The executive order currently in force broadly authorizes classification of infor-
mation concerning "foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States." Exec.
Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982). So, for example, a leak of what purported to be a
draft of the North American Free Trade Agreement bore what appeared to be the US
government classification of "confidential." See infra text accompanying note 66.
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istrative Procedure Act, expressly exempts "a military or foreign affairs
function of the United States" from otherwise applicable requirements for
notice-and-comment rule making.7
To be sure, diplomacy, foreign policy, and national security have tradi-
tionally been associated with higher levels of confidentiality and secrecy
than has domestic policy, a distinction generally reflected in the Constitu-
tion and the domestic law of foreign relations. This article raises the question
whether actual practice with respect to public participation in the area of the
environment and public health discriminates between domestic and foreign
policy contexts in a rational manner, analyzing the competing policies of
openness and secrecy in specific policy settings. Through the examination
of concrete narratives, the article seeks to stimulate debate on the question
whether these distinctions are warranted-a complicated issue that admit-
tedly has no simple answer.
Accordingly, this article examines three case studies that highlight these
disparities with particularity: (1) the first tuna dolphin decision under the
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI)8; (2) envi-
ronmental activities in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD); and (3) a comparison of the negotiating histories of
7. APA, supra note 3, § 553(a)(1). The exemption "is not to be loosely interpreted
to mean any function extending beyond the borders of the United States, but only those
'affairs' which so affect relations with other Governments, that, for example, public
rulemaking provisions would clearly provoke definitely undesirable international conse-
quences." S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946). Nonetheless, reliance on the
exception has received judicial approval in a number of contexts, most notably interna-
tional trade. See, e.g., American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers Textile and Apparel
Group v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (regulations relating to textile
imports pursuant to Multifiber Arrangement); Mast Indus. v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int'l. Trade
214 (1984), affd on other grounds sub nom. Mast Indus. v. United States, 822 F.2d 1069
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (same). The exception has been criticized and its modification or repeal
strongly recommended in the literature. See William D. Araiza, Note, Notice-and-Com-
ment Rights for Administrative Decisions Affecting International Trade: Heightened Need,
No Response, 99 YALE L.J. 669 (1989); Arthur Earl Bonfield, Military and Foreign
Affairs Function Rule-Making Under the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 221 (1972) (advocating
repeal of exception); Thomas M. Franck, Public Participation in the Foreign Policy
Process, in THE CONSITTIrON AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 66, 75 (F.
Wilcox & R. Frank ed. 1976) ("Total exemption of foreign affairs functions from admin-
istrative process is not justified. Many aspects of these functions are analogous to domestic
issues now subject to process; the fact that they take on an international dimension does
not necessarily or even probably mean that all forms of administrative process should be
excluded.").
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter GAIT].
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the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer9 and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).' Taken together, these
three factual and policy scenarios highlight: (1) variability in the treatment
of nongovernmental observers among multilateral fora; (2) uneven public
access to international negotiating processes on the national level through
the Executive Branch; (3) disparate treatment of nonstate actors from in-
dustry and environmental organizations at the international level; and (4)
lack of standardization among international institutions and within the Ex-
ecutive Branch in access to documentation produced by multilateral
organizations.
The first case study, on the tuna dolphin report issued under the aus-
pices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, shows that there are
significant disparities between applying the law in domestic US courts on
the one hand and in the quasi-adjudicatory GATT dispute settlement pro-
cess on the other. The second case study, on environmental activities in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), high-
lights significant divergences in the domestic treatment of important
documentation prepared by a key multilateral organization active on envi-
ronmental issues. This case study also documents differential treatment within
the OECD of industrial interests on the one hand and nongovernmental en-
vironmental groups on the other. The last case study, a comparison of the
negotiating processes for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer and the North American Free Trade Agreement, docu-
ments differences in the treatment of nongovernmental observers and access
to interim drafts in those two different contexts. These contrasting approaches
among the international processes are mirrored on the domestic level, where
the Executive Branch's policies in negotiating trade agreements differ sub-
stantially from those for the Montreal Protocol.
9. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
S. TREATY DOC. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 47,515
(1987), 17 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 256 (1987), Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:3151, 26 I.L.M.
1550 (1987), adjusted and amended, June 29, 1990, S. TREATY DOC. No. 4, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1 YB. INT'L ENVTL. L. 612 (1990), 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991),
adjusted and amended, Nov. 25, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 9, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 875 (1993) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
10. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada,
the Government of the United Mexican States, and the Government of the United States
of America, Dec. 17, 1992 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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II. THE GATI? TUNA DOLPHIN DECISION:
DISPARITIES BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORY PROCESSES
This controversy concerns tuna fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean (ETP), where schools of tuna often travel below pods of air-breathing
dolphins. Dolphins swim in the upper levels of the ocean, where they serve
as a visible indicator of the presence of tuna below. Fishing boats employing
the practice of "setting on dolphin" encircle pods of air-breathing dolphins
with a purse-seine net to capture the tuna below. Setting on dolphin can
result in widespread injury and death to the dolphins entangled in the nets.
When both dolphin and tuna together are surrounded by purse-seine nets,
the use of certain procedures can reduce injury or mortality to the dolphin.
A principal purpose of the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA) is assuring that "the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of
marine mammals permitted in the course of commercial fishing operations
be reduced to insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality and serious
injury rate."" The statute mandates a regulatory program to establish
industry-wide tuna harvesting practices designed to prevent the incidental
"taking" of marine mammals and, specifically, various species of dolphin.
After protracted litigation, the US fleet generally has come into compliance
with these requirements. However, foreign fleets not subject to US jurisdic-
tion, primarily those of Mexico and Venezuela, have had considerably higher
dolphin mortality rates. To address this problem, the MMPA requires the
Department of the Treasury, in which the Customs Service is located, to
"ban the importation of commercial fish or products from fish which have
been caught with commercial fishing technology which results in the inci-
dental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United
States standards.' 2
As a result of Executive Branch inaction with respect to foreign tuna
caught with technologies that harm dolphins, Congress amended the MMPA
in 1984 to clearly establish that yellowfin tuna harvested with purse-seines
in the ETP can be imported into the United States only upon a demonstra-
tion by the government of the foreign nation that it: (1) has in place a
regulatory program "comparable" to that of the US fleet for protecting ma-
11. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1994) [here-
inafter MMPA]. The House of Representatives held four days of public hearings on the
bill that subsequently became the MMPA. See H.R. REP. NO. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4144, 4145.
12. MMPA, supra note 11, § 1371(a)(2).
[Vol. 7:1
Public Participation in International Processes
rine mammals from commercial fishing operations and (2) has an average
incidental marine mammal taking rate "comparable" to that of the United
States fleet.'3 In 1988 Congress, still dissatisfied with the slow pace of Ex-
ecutive Branch implementation of the statute, further amended the law to
ensure that the average incidental taking of marine mammals by foreign
vessels did not exceed that of the US fleet by more than twenty-five percent
by the end of the 1990 fishing season.
4
By 1990, the Secretary of Commerce had neither issued findings of
comparability nor banned tuna imports from the offending nations. Frus-
trated with this delay, in June 1990 the Earth Island Institute and the Marine
Mammal Fund, two private environmental organizations with a particular
interest in marine mammal preservation, brought an action for mandamus in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to
compel the Executive Branch to comply with the MMPA. In August 1990
the court enjoined Executive Branch officials from permitting further im-
ports of yellowfin tuna caught with purse-seine nets into the United States
because no findings of comparability had been made." This action affected
tuna imports from Mexico, Venezuela, Vanuatu, Panama, and Ecuador.
Then, in September 1990, the Department of Commerce concluded that
Mexico, Venezuela, and Vanuatu satisfied the MMPA's comparability re-
quirements and consequently lifted the ban with respect to those countries.
This finding was made in reliance on a domestic regulation" that had been
promulgated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), an Executive Branch agency located in the Department of Com-
merce, after publication of a proposed rule and an opportunity for public
comment on that proposal. 7 Panama and Ecuador later prohibited their fleets
from setting on dolphin and were consequently exempted from the embargo.
13. Pub. L. No. 98-364, § 101, 98 Stat. 440 (1984). See H.R. REP. No. 758, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 635,
639.
14. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711, §
4, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988). See H.R. REP. NO. 970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-19 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6154, 6155-59.
15. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd,
929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
16. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(5)(iv)-(ix)(1995).
17. NOAA initially published a proposed rule to implement the 1984 amendments
in 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 28,963 (1986). The comment period on this proposal was subse-
quently extended, in particular to give potentially affected foreign nations a full opportunity
to comment. 51 Fed. Reg. 36,568 (1986). NOAA then published an interim final rule
with request for comments in 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 8910 (1988). A second interim final
rule with a request for comments, necessitated by the intervening amendments to the
MMPA enacted in 1988, was promulgated in 1989. 54 Fed. Reg. 9438 (1989). The final
regulation published in March 1990 reflected comments on the 1989 interim final rule.
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The district court subsequently invalidated the finding for Mexico, conclud-
ing that the Executive Branch's method of computation based on the NOAA
regulation was inconsistent with the MMPA and therefore illegal. After stay-
ing the district court's order directing the Executive Branch to renew the
import prohibition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed both orders of the district court, 8 and a ban on imports of Mexican
tuna once again took effect on February 22, 1991 .1
On November 5, 1990, Mexico requested consultations with the United
States concerning the tuna import ban under the auspices of the GATI, 10 the
principal multilateral instrument governing international trade relations
among states. The consultations between Mexico and the United States,
held on December 19, 1990, did not produce a result satisfactory to Mexico.
If negotiations and consultations are unsuccessful, an aggrieved party may
submit a complaint to the GAIT Council, which can appoint a panel of
experts to hear the dispute. Accordingly, on January 25, 1991, Mexico re-
quested that the GATT Council establish a dispute settlement panel to further
examine the matter.
On September 3, 1991, the three-member panel presented its final re-
port.21 That report noted that discrimination by importing states based on
the methods by which foreign goods are produced, as opposed to character-
istics of the foreign goods themselves, is not permitted by the GAT.
Consequently, it might be inferred from the panel's reasoning that the GAT
requires like treatment of imported products without regard to the environ-
mental policies of the country of export. Further, according to the report,
exceptions in the GAIT for trade measures directed at the protection of
animal life or health or the conservation of natural resources must be nar-
rowly construed. In light of that interpretation, the drafting history of the
agreement as interpreted by the panel, and the broader implications for in-
ternational trade, the panel concluded that trade measures to protect resources
outside the jurisdiction of a contracting party are not within the scope of the
exception from GATT obligations. According to the panel, the United States
had failed to demonstrate that the import restriction was primarily aimed at
18. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
19. The district court, on plaintiffs' motion, subsequently clarified the extent of a
secondary ban on imports from intermediary nations that purchase yellowfin tuna abroad
and export it to the United States. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826
(N.D. Cal. 1992), vacated and remanded on jurisdictional grounds sub nom. Earth Is-
land Inst. v. Brown, 28 F.3d 76 (9th Cir. 1994).
20. See GAIT, supra note 8.
21. Report of the Panel on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 155 (39th Supp. 1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M.
1594 (1991).
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conservation or that measures consistent with the GATT, such as an interna-
tionally agreed joint dolphin conservation program, were unavailable. For
these reasons, the panel found that both the primary embargo on Mexican
tuna and the secondary ban on imports of tuna from intermediary nations
were inconsistent with US obligations under the GATE"2 As of this writing,
the panel report has not been adopted by the GATT Council and conse-
quently does not represent an authoritative interpretation of that instrument
by the contracting parties to it.23
On October 26, 1992, US President George Bush signed into law the
International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992.4 The new statute is a modi-
fied version of a proposal by the Bush Administration, originally presented
in March 1992, that had been discussed with the governments of Mexico,
Venezuela, and Panama as a means of resolving their GATT concerns. The
Act amends the MMPA to accommodate commitments from foreign nations
like Mexico and Venezuela to make immediate reductions in dolphin mortal-
ity, culminating in a five-year moratorium on setting on dolphin beginning
in March 1994. If the foreign country were to comply fully with these un-
dertakings, the tuna import ban would be lifted. On the other hand, if the
Secretary of Commerce could not verify that the foreign state was fully
implementing its commitments in practice, the import ban would be insti-
tuted once again. As of this writing, no country has made a commitment of
the sort contemplated by the new statute, and the ban consequently remains
in effect.
22. See Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, The Collision of the Environ-
ment and Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,268, 10,272-73 (1992).
23. Mexico did not seek the adoption of this report at the time of its release, and
the GAIT Council rejected a request by the European Union to adopt the report. GATT
Council Refuses EC Request to Adopt Panel Report on U.S. Tuna Embargo, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 353 (1992). The European Union and the Netherlands then initiated a subse-
quent challenge to the secondary import ban, which is designed to discourage "tuna
laundering" by intermediary nations that purchase yellowfin tuna abroad and export it to
the United States. This panel report, like the first, found that the secondary import prohi-
bition is inconsistent with the United States' obligations pursuant to the GAT. United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 842 (1994). In a discussion
of the second report, the GAT Council is reported to have rejected a proposal from the
United States that would have opened further Council meetings on that case to the pub-
lic, and Mexico was said to consider requesting adoption of the first report. Frances
Williams, GATT Shuts Door on Environmentalists, FIN. TIMES, July 21, 1994, at 6. As of
this writing, neither report has been adopted by the GAIT Council and thus neither has
yet acquired legal force. See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 51, 94 (1987).
24. International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, 3425 (1992), 16 U.S.C. §§
1411-1418 (1994).
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The oral proceedings and written statements before the GAIT panel,
unlike the domestic legal proceeding for judicial review, were unavailable to
the public215 Dispute settlement in the GAIT, which is a government-to-
government process, does not allow for participation by private parties like
25. See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement
and Surveillance, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 215 annex para.
6(iv) (26th Supp. 1980) ("Written memoranda submitted to the panel have been consid-
ered confidential, but are made available to the parties to the dispute."). See also Decision
on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures § F, para. (f)(2),
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECrED DOCUMENTS 61 (36th Supp. 1990), reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 1031, 1033 (1989) (referencing suggested working procedures, found at id. at
1038, establishing that panel sessions will be closed and submissions to the panel will
remain confidential, stating that "the Parties to the dispute are requested not to release
any papers or make any statements in public regarding the dispute"). The North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement contains similar requirements. NAFTA, supra note 10, art.
2012, para. 1(b) ("The panel's hearings, deliberations and initial report, and all written
submissions to and communications with the panel shall be confidential."). The Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in GAIT, which was completed in late 1993
and signed on April 15, 1994, makes some salutary changes to this practice, but does not
totally correct the deficiencies in the process. See Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes para. 18.2, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) ("Written
submissions to the panel or the [newly created] Appellate Body shall be treated as confi-
dential, but shall be made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this
Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing statement [sic] of its
own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential, [sic] information sub-
mitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which that Member has
designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member,
provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written submis-
sions that could be disclosed to the public."). The Uruguay Round implementing legislation
establishes certain domestic statutory requirements for public notice, an opportunity for
public comment, and public access to documentation as part of the panel dispute settle-
ment process. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 127, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4809, 4835-36 (1994) (access to the newly created World Trade Organization's dispute
settlement process). However, similar concerns as to public access persist even under the
Uruguay Round and within the World Trade Organization created by the Uruguay Round.
See News Leaders Demand Access to WTO Deliberations, Bus. Wire, Sept. 14, 1994
available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File (reproducing text of letter signed by 51
leaders of major news organizations and journalism groups asserting that "[t]he public
and press should be able to monitor deliberations of [World Trade Organization] dispute
settlement panels"). Cf Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 804 F.
Supp. 385, 388 (D.D.C. 1992) (ordering the Executive Branch to make available for
public inspection and copying submissions made by the US government to dispute reso-
lution panels established pursuant to the GATT, based in part on the conclusion that
"[tihe GAT procedural rules favor confidentiality of [governmental submissions to dis-
pute settlement panels], but do not require it"). Anecdotal reports suggest that, even after
this case, some requesters have encountered difficulties in acquiring publicly available
documents and that there is no systematic mechanism at the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) for the public to obtain access to those documents. In re-
sponse to the second tuna panel report in the dispute settlement proceeding initiated by
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the Earth Island Institute.26 Many of the issues in the GAIT dispute settle-
ment proceeding were similar to those in the domestic lawsuit, and the relevant
facts were virtually identical. Nonetheless, the environmental group that
initiated the legal action at the domestic level had no formal right to make a
the European Union and the Netherlands, see supra note 23, USTR announced that:
The United States will challenge the dispute settlement panel's failure to pro-
vide a fair hearing and due process, and will ask for a full review of the report,
both substantively and procedurally, by the GATT Council, or reconsideration
by the panel in this case. The GAT Council or panel should hold further pro-
ceedings in public and allow non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
participate. In addition, all documents filed from any source should be immedi-
ately made public.
USTR Kantor to Challenge GATr Panel's Failure to Provide Open Hearings and Due
Process Regarding U.S. Tuna Embargoes, Substantive Matters, Office of the United States
Trade Representative Press Release (May 23, 1994). One of the principal authorities on
the GATr has observed that:
[Tihe GAIT tends too often to try to operate in secrecy, attempting to avoid
public and news media accounts of its actions. In recent years, this has become
almost a charade, because many of the key documents, most importantly the
early results of a GATT dispute settlement panel report, leak out almost imme-
diately to the press. For purposes of gaining a broader- constituency among the
various policy interested communities in the world, gaining the trust of those
constituencies, enhancing public understanding, as well as avoiding the "cha-
rade" of ineffective attempts to maintain secrecy, the GAT could go much
further in providing "transparency" of its processes.
John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Con-
flict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1255 (1992). A central component of the Uruguay
Round is the creation of a new World Trade Organization (WTO), whose purposes and
procedures are very similar to those of the GAT. See Agreement Establishing the Multi-
lateral Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 15 (1994). The Uruguay Round strengthens the
GAIT dispute settlement procedures by eliminating the process by which one GAIT
contracting party can frustrate consensus by refusing to accept a panel report, thereby
"blocking" its adoption. See Davey, supra note 23, at 94. Instead, the Uruguay Round
specifies that panel reports shall be finally adopted within 60 days of issuance unless an
appeal is lodged with a newly established standing Appellate Body, whose reports must
be adopted by the Council within 30 days of issuance unless rejected by WTO member
states acting by consensus. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes, supra, paras. 16.4, 17.14.
26. Apart from the government-to-government character of the GAIT dispute settle-
ment procedures, those proceedings also differ from a case in a domestic judicial tribunal
by virtue of their emphasis on negotiation and consultation. The GAIT's dispute settle-
ment mechanisms first encourage contracting parties to settle differences through direct
negotiation before they resort to the panel process. See GAIT, supra note 8, art. XXII
(consultation). Even after a panel has been appointed, the governmental parties to the
dispute may still reach an accommodation between themselves through a negotiated "settle-
ment." Accordingly, the issue of confidentiality in the GAIT dispute settlement process
must be read against a background in which governments may state not only legal argu-
ments but also negotiating positions at both the consultative and panel stages of the
dispute settlement process.
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submission directly to the GAT panel. The Institute's lawyer traveled to
Geneva for the oral proceedings before the panel but was compelled to wait
in the corridor while the panel heard arguments from representatives of the
Mexican and US governments. However, according to the dispute settle-
ment panel's report, ten other GAIT parties and the European Community
(now the European Union) made written submissions to the panel, all of
which were critical of the MMPA ban and none of which argued that that
action was consistent with the GAIT.
Representation of the United States by the Executive Branch, which
had implemented the tuna ban only under a court order and had previously
attempted to lift the ban in a manner contrary to law, gave rise to additional
questions concerning the adequacy of the spectrum of issues presented to
the GAT panel. Although the Executive Branch solicited some input from
certain members of the public while preparing its submission to the panel, 27
those views at most affected only the posture of the United States in the
dispute. In any event the Executive Branch must articulate the government's
position and does not necessarily reflect the interests of concerned nonstate
actors. While helpful, this practice of public input cannot be considered a
substitute for opportunities for affected private parties to submit written or
oral statements, or both, directly to the dispute settlement panel. Moreover,
the GATT panel, at least as a formal matter, did not seek, and may not have
had access to, a variety of views that would have assisted in its ruling on one
of the most contentious disputes in the GATIT's history.
In the recently decided GATT challenge by the European Union to the
US corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards,8 one of the most
promising policy options for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases in this
country, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) did
not respond to a request from concerned private parties, including the US
consumer organization Public Citizen, to transmit a separate statement on
their behalf directly to the panel as an attachment to the US government's
own submission.29 In that case, the European Union agreed to the release of
its complaint to Public Citizen. The EU, however, did not consent to the
release of its written submissions to the panel in support of its complaint.
USTR released its responsive submissions on behalf of the United States,
but deleted portions addressing the EU's arguments.
27. See Letter from Julius L. Katz, Deputy United States Trade Representative, to
Justin Ward, Senior Resource Specialist, and Al Meyerhoff, Senior Attorney, Natural
Resources Defense Council (Apr. 17, 1992).
28. United States-Taxes on Automobiles, GAT" Doc. DS31/R (Sept. 29, 1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1399 (1994).
29. In the proceeding initiated by the European Union (EU) and the Netherlands
challenging the secondary embargo under the MMPA, see supra note 23, USTR attached
newspaper clippings to the US submission to the GATT dispute settlement panel.
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Even if the practice in the CAFE case were to become standard, it
would still be inadequate because of the confidentiality of the complaining
party's submission, which is unavailable to nongovernmental parties. Under
these circumstances, the private party must conjecture as to the basis for the
challenge, which necessarily renders its submission less informed, less ef-
fective, and less useful to the dispute settlement panel than would otherwise
be the case? There is still no mechanism for interested nonstate actors to
communicate their views and arguments formally to the new World Trade
Organization (WTO) dispute settlement panels that are the successors to
those previously constituted under the GATT. Other documentation impor-
tant to the integrity of a quasi-adjudicatory process like dispute settlement
before the GAIT or WTO dispute settlement panels may simply not exist.
Transcripts are not maintained of oral hearings before the GATT panels,
which similarly do not create a written record of their proceedings.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES IN THE OECD:
NONSTATE ACTORS IN MULTILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION DOCUMENTS
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
has been one of the principal intergovernmental organizations active in the
environmental area, chiefly through its Environmental Policy Committee,
which was established in 1970. The OECD, created by multilateral treaty in
30. Although not precisely analogous to government-to-government proceedings
under international trade agreements, certain domestic proceedings addressing interna-
tional trade provide for somewhat greater public access than GATT dispute settlement.
The Trade Representative is authorized to take retaliatory action against foreign states
that deny the United States rights under a trade agreement or unjustifiably restrict the
importation of US goods. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994). Before making a final determination,
public consultation and a hearing may be required. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(b)(1)(A)(1994).
For instance, in response to a petition from US exporters, USTR solicited public com-
.ment on, and held a public hearing concerning, Thailand's restrictions on access by US
companies to the Thai cigarette market. See 54 Fed. Reg. 32,731 (1989) (notice of public
hearing); 54 Fed. Reg. 23,724 (1989) (notice of initiation of investigation and request for
written comments). This issue ultimately was addressed by a GATT dispute settlement
panel. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELErED DOCUMENTS 200 (37th Supp. 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M.
1122 (1991). Similarly, antidumping and countervailing duties cases initiated by private
parties involve the preparation of a public reading file. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(f) (1994)
(access to information); I BRUCE E. CLUBB, UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE LAW §§
20.27, 21.21 (1991) (access to information in antidumping and countervailing duties
cases).
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1960, consists of twenty-five member states, most of which have industrial-
ized market economies. The Secretariat of the Organisation, whose primary
mandate is to promote economic growth and trade, is located in Paris. The
OECD serves as an arena for multilateral discussion of informational or
analytical studies, the negotiation of recommendations that contain nonbinding
undertakings for those OECD members that agree to them, and the adoption
of decisions that are binding on member states that accept them.3
Among other subject matter areas, the OECD has provided a forum for
the adoption of numerous recommendations on transboundary pollution32
and environmental impact assessment.3 Although perhaps less numerous
than nonbinding recommendations in the environmental area, binding deci-
sions have been adopted on such matters as exports of hazardous wastes.4
31. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Dec. 14, 1960, art. 5(a) & (b), 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 888 U.N.T.S. 179. The
original members of the organization are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Australia, Finland, Mexico, Japan, and New Zealand later became
OECD members in 1971, 1969, 1994, 1964, and 1973 respectively.
32. E.g., Recommendation for Strengthening International Co-operation on Envi-
ronmental Protection in Frontier Regions, OECD Doc. C(78)77, reprinted in
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 154 (1986) [hereinafter OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT], 17 I.L.M. 1530
(1978); Reco7:.-. adation for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access
and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Doc. C(77)28,
reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 150, 4 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 53
(1978), 16 I.L.M. 977 (1977); Recommendation on Equal Right of Access in Relation to
Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Doe. C(76)55, reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT, supra, at 148, 2 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 104 (1976), 15 I.L.M. 1218 (1976);
Recommendation on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Doe. C(74)224,
reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 142, 1 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 44
(1975), 14 I.L.M. 242 (1975).
33. E.g., Recommendation Concerning Measures Required to Facilitate the Envi-
ronmental Assessment of Development Assistance Projects and Programmes, OECD Doe.
C(86)26; Recommendation on Environmental Assessment of Development Assistance
Projects and Programmes, OECD Doe. C(85)104, reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT, supra note 32, at 30; Recommendation on the Assessment of Projects With
Significant Impact on the Environment, OECD Doe. C(79)116, reprinted in OECD AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 32, at 29,5 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 154 (1979); Recommen-
dation on the Analysis of the Environmental Consequences of Significant Public and
Private Projects, OECD Doc. C(74)216, reprinted in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 69 (1979),
OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 32, at 28.
34. E.g., Decision Concerning the Control of Transfrontier Movements of Wastes
Destined for Recovery Operations, O.E.C.D. Doe. C(92)39, reprinted (in data format
only) in 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. (1992); Decision-Recommendation on the Reduction of
Transfrontier Movements of Wastes, O.E.C.D. Doe. C(90)178, reprinted (in data format
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Coordinating national policies and reconciling rational regulatory approaches
for toxic substances have been particularly active areas, primarily through
the Chemicals Group, established in the early 1970s, which reports to the
ministerial-level Environmental Policy Committee. The Chemicals Group
has taken up the following issues, among others, which have produced a
number of OECD decisions and recommendations: exports of pesticides and
industrial chemicals," chemical testing,' notification of industrial accidents,'
and the treatment of confidential business information.38
In the late 1970s, the Office of Toxic Substances of the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) undertook to regularize public input into
the Executive Branch's work related to the OECD Chemicals Group. To
this end, the EPA designated the nonprofit Conservation Foundation (now
part of the World Wildlife Fund) as the principal conduit and coordinator
for input from the nongovernmental environmental community, and the
Chemical Manufacturers Association has performed a similar function for
industry. Since then, representatives of environmental organizations and in-
dustry have regularly participated in US delegations to Chemicals Group
meetings as accredited private sector advisers on such issues as risk reduc-
tion for lead, pesticide regulation, chemical accidents, chemical testing,
treatment of confidential business information, and exports of domestically
only) in 2 YB. INT'L ENVTL. L. (1991); Decision on Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous
Wastes, OECD Doc. C(88)90, reprinted in 28 I.LM. 259 (1989); Decision-Recommendation on
Exports of Hazardous Wastes from the OECD Area, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(86)64, reprinted in OECD
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 32, at 86,25 I.L.M. 1010 (1986); Decision-Recommenda-
tion on Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Waste, OECD Doc. C(83)180, reprinted in OECD
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 32, at 78,23 I.L.M. 214 (1984).
35. E.g., Recommendation on Information Exchange Related to Export of Banned
or Severely Restricted Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(84)37, reprinted in OECD AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 32, at 137, 12 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 116 (1984), 23 I.L.M. 664
(1984).
36. E.g., Decision on the Minimum Pre-Marketing Set of Data in the Assessment
of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(82)196, reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 32, at 122, 22 I.L.M. 909 (1983); Decision on the Mutual Acceptance of Data in the
Assessment of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(81)30, reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT, supra note 32, at 109.
37. E.g., Decision-Recommendation Concerning Provision of Information to the
Public and Public Participation in Decision-Making Processes Related to the Prevention
of, and Response to, Accidents Involving Hazardous Substances, OECD Doc. C(88)85,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 278 (1989); Decision on the Exchange of Information Concerning
Accidents Capable of Causing Transfrontier Damage, OECD Doc. C(88)84, reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 249 (1989).
38. E.g., Recommendation on the Exchange of Confidential Data on Chemicals,
OECD Doc. C(83)97, reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 32, at
129; Recommendation on the Protection of Proprietary Rights to Data Submitted in No-
tifications of New Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(83)96, reprinted in OECD AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 32, at 128.
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prohibited pesticides and industrial chemicals. On occasion, the EPA has
provided financial support for travel by nonprofit environmental organiza-
tions that otherwise would be unable to participate in these activities. In
recent years, the OECD's environmental agenda has been advanced through
greater use of open workshops, to which environmental groups and industry
interests have been invited in their own right. For example, such workshops
were recently held on chemical release inventories and "right to know" is-
sues.
As part of their relationship with the private sector on matters related
to the work of the Chemicals Group and other OECD activities, EPA offi-
cials have freely made OECD documentation available to representatives of
organizations that have participated in that work. Those documents include
some designated as "restricted," including interim drafts of nonbinding rec-
ommendations or binding decisions on which comment has been requested
from environmental organizations and industry. According to anecdotal ac-
counts, the "restricted" designation, at least on occasion, has been interpreted
both by the OECD Secretariat and by Executive Branch officials to imply
only that documentation may not be distributed by the OECD Secretariat
other than to officials of member state governments or cited as an official
statement of the organization. According to this view, the "restricted" desig-
nation does not constrain the exercise of discretion by member state
governments in communications with the private sector. Indeed, some pri-
vate sector advisers to US delegations to OECD Chemicals Group activities
believe that they receive OECD "restricted" documents in a representative
capacity and that the EPA, as part of the preparatory process, expects re-
cipients to transmit that documentation to other interested individuals and
groups-for example, to other environmental nonprofit organizations or to
other chemical companies. Anecdotal accounts from private sector advisers
to US government delegations, including representatives of both industry
and environmental groups, also confirm that on occasion the OECD Secre-
tariat itself has provided "restricted" documentation directly to individuals
who have been active over a period of time in the organization's activities on
chemicals.
A relatively flexible and relaxed approach to the availability of OECD
"restricted" documentation seems to be supported by such authority as is
available from the organization. A 1962 OECD Council resolution defines
the "restricted" category as consisting of "documents, information of [sic]
texts which should not be communicated except for official purposes."39
39. Resolution Concerning the Classification of Documents and Security Precau-
tions, OECD Doc. C(62)11 § I, para. b. The United Nations similarly has three categories
of documents: (1) general; (2) limited; and (3) restricted. "The designation RESTRICTED
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"Restricted" is an intermediate level of designation, lying between "general
distribution" and "confidential," the latter defined as "documents, informa-
tion or texts[,J the unauthorized disclosure of which would seriously prejudice
the interest of the Organisation or of any of its Members.""0 The resolution
also requests that the "Members and the Secretary General take necessary
action to ensure the security of confidential and restricted documents, infor-
mation or texts."'4 ' The OECD's deputy legal counsel explains this language
as follows:
Most documentation of the Organisation is issued as "restricted."
No agreed definition has been given to the term "official purposes."
This rule is understood, prima facie, to restrict routine circulation
to Government officials, but the Organisation and Members have,
under this standard, made such documents available on a restricted
basis to non-governmental organisations where necessary for con-
sultations to occur.2
Practices that have evolved over time with respect to participation by
nongovernmental actors in the OECD Chemicals Group have not been uni-
formly applied to other areas of US participation in the OECD's
environmental work. Since 1993, the Joint Sessions of Trade and Environ-
ment Experts have met as part of a cooperative arrangement of the OECD's
Trade Committee and its Environmental Policy Committee. The efforts of
this group have produced, among other things, a set of procedural guide-
lines on integrating trade and environment policies. 3 A number of
is used on documents and meeting records whose contents require at the time of issuance
that they not be made public." United Nations Documentation: A Brief Guide, U.N. Doc.
ST/LIB/34/Rev.1 para. 41(c) (1981). See generally U.N. Doc. ST/AI/189/Add.16 (prin-
ciples concerning classification and declassification of documents by UN Secretariat).
Interim drafts of multilateral environmental agreements negotiated under United Na-
tions auspices generally seem to receive the designation "limited" or "restricted." These
UN documents nonetheless circulate relatively freely both at the international and do-
mestic levels, in part through access at UN depository libraries. The UN designations do
not imply any obligation on the part of governments to refrain from public distribution of
limited or restricted documents. The documentation of international organizations ap-
pears to be something of a gray area from the point of view of domestic law and practice.
Documents of international organizations, including those designated by the OECD as
"restricted," do not routinely receive an official US government classification. The De-
partment of State reports that it has no general policy concerning public access to
international organization documents but instead treats even those with identical desig-
nations from different international organizations on a case by case basis.
40. Resolution Concerning the Classification of Documents and Security Precau-
tions, supra note 39, § I, para. b.
41. Id.§Ill.
42. Letter from David H. Small, Deputy Legal Counsel, Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development, to David A. Wirth (Sept. 21, 1993).
43. Trade and Environment, OECD Doc. GD(93)99 (1994).
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representatives of nongovernmental environmental organizations have been
invited to attend meetings of the Joint Sessions of Trade and Environment
Experts as private sector advisers to their own national delegations, and in
particular as accredited members of the US delegation." In strong contrast
to the EPA's practice with respect to the OECD Chemicals Group, the Of-
fice of the United States Trade Representative has required these individuals,
as a condition of their participation on the US delegation to the OECD, to
execute confidentiality agreements which include the following features:
* an express statement of an intent to be legally bound;
* a provision barring the release of OECD documents designated as
"restricted";
* a promise not to reveal the contents of oral and written statements
made by representatives of foreign governments or the OECD Sec-
retariat;
* a prohibition on public disclosure of the existence of OECD "re-
stricted" documentation or oral and written statements by
representatives of foreign governments or the OECD Secretariat;
" a commitment to refrain from requesting such documents or infor-
mation from foreign governments or international organizations, and
a promise not to encourage others to attempt to obtain such docu-
ments or information;
" a requirement to return all OECD documentation designated as "re-
stricted" to the United States Government; and
* provisions acknowledging the potential criminal consequences of
violation of the agreement. 5
According to Executive Branch officials, the differences between prac-
tice with respect to private sector advisers in the OECD's work on trade and
environment on the one hand and chemicals on the other may be explained in
part by the more policy-oriented focus of the environment and trade efforts.
But in the early 1980s nongovernmental environmental representatives were
included in US delegations to the Chemicals Group's undertaking on infor-
mation exchange related to the export of banned or severely restricted
chemicals-an issue with a similarly high policy component and one that
44. Anecdotal reports suggest that there has been some objection to this approach,
particularly as practiced by the United States, from OECD member states that do not
have nongovernmental advisers on their delegations. Other OECD member states are
said to have insisted on confidentiality as a condition of attendance by US nongovern-
mental advisers.
45. See, e.g., Agreement between Durwood Zaelke and the United States of America
(Jan. 29, 1993) (on file with author). The form of this agreement is said to be similar to
that used for the statutorily created private sector trade advisory committees. See infra
note 73 and accompanying text.
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was enormously controversial at the time. More recently, discussions in the
OECD over risk reduction for lead have been very contentious and defi-
nitely policy oriented. As demonstrated by the example of the conditions on
the participation of private sector advisers on US delegations to the OECD
Joint Sessions of Trade and Environment Experts, standards for public par-
ticipation in OECD environmental activities both at the international and
national levels have not been reduced to writing, and in practice are highly
variable and ultimately dependent on the exercise of discretion by individual
governmental officials. The willingness of other governments to accept the
presence of nongovernmental representatives in each instance is also a policy
factor, although questions remain as to the appropriateness or legal author-
ity of foreign governments to determine the composition of US delegations
in the OECD.
The undertakings described so far-the EPA program with respect to
the Chemicals Group and the inclusion of environmental representatives in
trade and environment delegations led by USTR-at least as a formal mat-
ter are intended strictly to provide advice to Executive Branch policy makers
and membership for representatives of the public on official US government
delegations to the OECD. Private sector advisers from industry and envi-
ronmental organizations, accredited as members of US delegations to the
OECD, are subject to "delegation discipline" via governmental instructions.
Moreover, the consultative arrangements with industry and environmental
organizations provide input principally into the US policy process and only
indirectly create access to the multilateral forum of the OECD.
Industry and trade unions, through additional formal, official channels
created by the multilateral forum of the OECD itself, have input and access
directly to the organization and its Secretariat through the Business and
Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC)"' and the Trade Union Advisory Com-
mittee (TUAC). BIAC and TUAC are independent organizations whose
representatives in the United States are the United States Council for Inter-
national Business and the AFL-CIO, respectively. By comparison with BIAC,
46. According to BIAC literature:
[Tihe Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) was
constituted in March 1962 as an independent organisation officially recognized
by the OECD as being representative of business and industry. BIAC's mem-
bers include the industrial and employers' organisations of the 24 OECD Member
Countries. In the framework of its consultative status with the OECD, BIAC's
role is to provide OECD and its Member Governments the benefit of construc-
tive comments based on the practical experience of the business community.
BIAC is the advocate of business, speaking and working in defense of free
enterprise and the market economy.
Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD, BIAC: Annual Report (1993).
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TUAC has had a relatively low profile with respect to the OECD's environ-
mental work. Although the creation of a parallel environmental entity has
been discussed from time to time, there is no comparable conduit for access
directly to the multilateral forum of the OECD for nongovernmental envi-
ronmental organizations in member countries.
A 1962 OECD Council decision'7 governing relations with international
nongovernmental organizations does not mention BIAC or TUAC by name
but instead sets out criteria for those nongovernmental organizations that
may formally be designated by the OECD Council for purposes of ongoing
consultation. Other nongovernmental organizations that have been granted
consultative status include the International Association of Crafts and Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises, the International Federation of Agricultural
Producers, and the European Confederation of Agriculture. Once granted
that status, an international nongovernmental organization may
hold exchanges of views with the [OECD] at meetings convened
either at its own request or on the initiative of the Secretary-Gen-
eral dealing with subjects of common interest or subjects determined
beforehand which have a bearing on the work of the [OECD][;
and] receive general information on the work of the [OECD] and
certain of the [OECD's] documents or summaries thereof, when-
ever the Secretary-General considers such documents or summaries
useful for the study of a particular subject.'"
With respect to documentation, the OECD's Deputy Legal Counsel notes
that:
[w]hile, in practice, BIAC and TUAC are often provided restricted
documents necessary for meaningful consultations with various
OECD bodies, they cannot be said to have the right to receive any
particular documentation. OECD has granted no such right to any
[nongovernmental organization], and retains complete legal free-
dom in the matter.'9
In the Chemicals Group, the Secretariat regularly consults with BIAC
and TUAC in advance of formal intergovernmental meetings as well as with
representatives of environmental groups on occasion. The Bureau of the
Chemicals Group, composed of governmental representatives, also meets
frequently directly with BIAC and TUAC representatives. Additionally, BIAC
and TUAC have the prerogative of circulating written materials to the Sec-
retariat and governmental officials on national delegations. Although BIAC
47. Decision on Relations with International Non-Governmental Organizations,
O.E.C.D. Doc. C(62)45 (1962).
48. Id. at para. 3(a) & (b).
49. Letter from David H. Small to David A. Wirth, supra note 42.
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may not have a right to receive any particular piece of official OECD docu-
mentation in advance of general distribution to the public at large, anecdotal
reports from industry representatives and others confirm that in practice a
significant amount of "restricted" documentation circulates through this chan-
nel. Tellingly, private parties in the United States received, through BIAC
channels, some of the same "restricted" documents that were controlled by
the confidentiality agreements USTR required of nongovernmental private
sector advisers accredited to US delegations. So, for instance, the US Coun-
cil for International Business transmitted its views to BIAC, which then
commented on a draft of the procedural guidelines that were elaborated by
the OECD Joint Sessions of Trade and Environment Experts." Presumably,
those comments were informed by, if they did not directly rely on, the "re-
stricted" documentation provided on this OECD undertaking to BIAC, which
was not generally available to other interested individuals and organiza-
tions.
Individuals representing industry interests that are also affiliated with
BIAC have been accredited as members of national delegations from the
United States, the Netherlands, Austria and other countries. In the Chemi-
cals Group, BIAC does not customarily have access as a formal observer to
intergovernmental meetings with a "seat at the table" in its own right. How-
ever, at a day-long OECD-sponsored expert-level Special Session on
Pesticides in May 1992 organized under the auspices of the Chemicals Group,
both a pesticides industry representative and the World Wildlife Fund, a
nongovernmental environmental organization, were seated as observers in
their own right. But sometimes BIAC has been accredited to intergovern-
mental meetings as a formal observer with the privilege to speak, with no
comparable representation from the nongovernmental environmental com-
munity. The best example of this practice is probably the regular presence
of a formally accredited BIAC observer who may speak in intergovernmen-
tal meetings of the OECD's Waste Management Policy Group, which reports
to the Pollution Prevention and Control Group, which in turn is a subsidiary
body created under the auspices of the ministerial Environmental Policy
Committee.
In short, there appears to be no clear or standardized policy, or even a
pattern of practice, as to how the officially recognized advisory committees,
BIAC and TUAC, may participate in the environmental work of the OECD's
intergovernmental forum. Nevertheless, it is clear that through these chan-
nels certain segments of the nongovernmental community, most notably
business and industry, have greater access to OECD "restricted" documen-
50. See BIAC Information, Jan.-Feb. 1993 (bimonthly review of BIAC plans and
activities published in Paris).
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tation than do ordinary members of the public. The role of the advisory
committees formally recognized by the OECD also creates unwarranted dis-
tinctions among otherwise comparable segments of the private sector. In
actual practice BIAC's special privileges most likely provide at most a mar-
ginal degree of extra input into the OECD's activities by comparison with
other elements of the private sector, such as nongovernmental environmen-
tal organizations. But this is only true to the extent that documentation,
information, and access through alternative channels to BIAC and TUAC
are open and flexible. In some specific cases, such as the work of the Joint
Sessions of Trade and Environment Experts, the lack of an analogue to
BIAC or TUAC to serve the nongovernmental environmental community in
OECD members states may result in significant disparities in terms of ac-
cess between business and industry on the one hand and nongovernmental
environmental organizations on the other.
IV. STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE: DISPARITIES IN PUBLIC ACCESS TO
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING PROCESSES ON THE
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS
In the mid- 1970s, in work that has now been awarded the Nobel Prize
in chemistry, scientists theorized that chlorine from chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) could attenuate the stratospheric ozone layer that protects life on
earth from harmful levels of ultraviolet (UV) radiation. By increasing the
amount of UV radiation reaching the Earth's surface, stratospheric ozone
loss could be expected to increase the incidence of human skin cancers and
cataracts, suppress human immune systems, damage crops and aquatic or-
ganisms, exacerbate smog formation, and accelerate the degradation of
outdoor materials. CFCs, which are nonflammable and biologically inert,
have important industrial and consumer uses as aerosol propellants, as foam-
blowing agents, as refrigerants, in air conditioning systems for buildings
and motor vehicles, and as industrial solvents.
The Clean Air Act formerly directed the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to respond by regulation if there was reason to believe that
human activities that damage the ozone layer might endanger public health
and the environment." In response to considerable public and scientific con-
51. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7457 (repealed 1990). In the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, section 157 was repealed and replaced with a new and considerably more
detailed statutory directive tracking the Montreal Protocol. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7671-7671q (1994).
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cern, in 1978 the EPA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), through
domestic notice-and-comment rule making proceedings under related statu-
tory authorities,52 prohibited nonessential uses of ozone-destroying CFCs
such as spray aerosol propellants as a matter of domestic US regulation.53 A
number of other countries, including Canada and the Nordic nations, en-
acted similar controls on nonessential aerosol uses of CFCs. By contrast,
the European Community (now the European Union) established a limit,
considerably above then-existing levels, on total CFC production.4 These
national efforts were coordinated, if at all, primarily through informal ex-
changes of information and bilateral consultations.
Recognizing the utility of greater coordination of international action
on the ozone layer, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
initiated a multilateral process for addressing this global issue in the late
1970s and early 1980s. Early in this process, governments negotiating un-
der UNEP auspices made an explicit decision to bifurcate this undertaking.
One product was to be a so-called "framework" multilateral convention.
Ancillary agreements, known as "protocols," containing substantive regula-
tory measures, would be appended to this convention. The ozone umbrella
treaty evolved into the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer," concluded in March 1985, which contains no regulatory require-
ments but instead is designed to encourage multilateral cooperation and
exchange of information. Negotiations on the more substantive CFC proto-
col broke down, primarily due to differences in regulatory approaches between
countries like the United States that had eliminated aerosol uses and the
European Community, which had established controls on production gener-
ally.
52. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (1994) (rule making);
42 Fed. Reg. 24,542 (1977) (EPA-proposed rule prohibiting most manufacture, process-
ing, and distribution in commerce of CFCs); 42 Fed. Reg. 24,535 (1977) (FDA proposal
to phase out nonessential uses of CFC propellants). The 1978 aerosol propellant bans
were promulgated under the authority of the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. However, the Clean Air Act contains rule-making
procedures similar to those followed for the 1978 regulations promulgated by the FDA
and EPA. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (rule making).
53. 21 C.F.R. § 2.125; 40 C.F.R. part 762; 43 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1978) (EPA final
rule prohibiting most manufacture, processing, and distribution in commerce of CFCs);
43 Fed. Reg. 11,301 (1978) (FDA final rule prohibiting use of certain CFCs as propel-
lants).
54. See THOMAS B. STOEL JR. Er AL., FLUOROCARBON REGULATION: AN INTER-
NATIONAL COMPARISON (1980).
55. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,097, reprinted in 14 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 72 (1985), 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) [here-
inafter Vienna Convention].
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Renegotiation of the protocol in late 1986 after a scheduled one-year
"cooling off' period coincided with an upsurge in scientific and public con-
cern about a seasonal, continent-sized thinning or "hole" in the ozone layer
over Antarctica. By this time, it had become apparent that the limited US
ban on a small number of CFC uses was insufficient to address grave threats
to the integrity of the stratospheric ozone layer. Accordingly, after being
prodded with a lawsuit,56 the Executive Branch in effect chose UNEP's mul-
tilateral forum as the venue for crafting additional domestic and international
policy responses for further mitigating stratospheric ozone depletion.
The resulting Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer," which sets out a precise numerical reduction schedule with firm
deadlines for phasing out chemicals that may deplete the ozone layer, is now
widely regarded as an effective, potentially global solution to the problem of
ozone depletion. Significantly, from the beginning of the reconstituted nego-
tiations in 1986, it was assumed that a rule promulgated pursuant to the
then-existing Clean Air Act would be the vehicle for domestic implementa-
tion of the international instrument. Nonetheless, the Executive Branch
submitted both the Protocol and the framework Vienna Convention to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification." The Protocol has since
56. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas, Civ. No. 84-3587 (D.D.C.
May 19, 1987) (consent decree establishing schedule for regulatory action on CFCs).
57. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 9. See generally RICHARD E. BENEDICK,
OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET" (1991) (de-
scribing negotiations).
58. See 134 Cong. Rec. 3718 (1988) (Senate resolution of advice and consent to
ratification of Montreal Protocol); 132 Cong. Rec. 17560 (1986) (same for Vienna Con-
vention). According to State Department policy, a choice between concluding an
international agreement as, on the one hand, a treaty in the constitutional sense and, on
the other, an executive agreement is determined by consideration of the following eight
factors:
(a) the extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting
the nation as a whole; (b) whether the agreement is intended to affect State
laws; (c) whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of
subsequent legislation by the Congress; (d) past United States practice with
respect to similar agreements; (e) the preference of the Congress with respect
to a particular type of agreement; (f) the degree of formality desired for an
agreement; (g) the proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt
conclusion of an agreement, and the desirability of concluding a routine or
short-term agreement; and (h) the general international practice with respect to
similar agreements.
State Department Procedures on Treaties and other International Agreements, partial
text Circular 175, Oct. 25, 1974, 11 F.A.M. § 721.3, reprinted in 1 MICHAEL J. GLENNON
& THOMAS M. FRANCK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND
SOURCES 205 (1980).
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been revised twice, in 1990 and 1992, to reflect scientific projections and
new empirical evidence of greater loss of stratospheric ozone than originally
anticipated.
UNEP accredited nongovernmental environmental observers from a
number of countries to working group meetings leading up to the diplomatic
conference that adopted the Protocol. The international organization made
drafts of the agreement's text and other UNEP documentation available to
nongovernmental observers in a manner similar to that for communicating
with governmental representatives. Accredited representatives of environ-
mental organizations were permitted to circulate papers and to speak on the
floor of the meeting after requesting permission in advance.
Although the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol did not track the
requirements of a domestic regulatory proceeding, the EPA and the State
Department nevertheless created a number of opportunities for public input
into that process. The EPA described its initial program plan, 9 including a
timetable of activities, in some detail in the Federal Register. The EPA spon-
sored workshops and conferences on stratospheric ozone,' also announced
in the Federal Register, which were designed to inform the US negotiating
position and to which members of the public were invited as participants
and presenters. At least one of those conferences was cosponsored with
UNEP, the international forum under whose auspices the Protocol was ne-
gotiated. The Department of State and the EPA produced an environmental
impact statement (EIS),61 the preparation of which involved both the solici-
tation of public comments and responses to those comments. During at least
some sessions of thp international negotiations themselves, the US delega-
tion held daily briefings at which the input of nongovernmental observers,
including both nonprofit environmental organizations and industry repre-
sentatives, was expressly solicited. Although not officially published by the
Executive Branch, successive negotiating drafts circulated freely among
nongovernmental observers and the public generally.
59. 51 Fed. Reg. 1257 (1986) (announcement of program plan).
60. 51 Fed. Reg. 21,576 (1986) (announcement of workshop in July 1986 concern-
ing alternative control strategies); 51 Fed. Reg. 5091 (1986) (announcement of workshop
concerning future use of CFCs and other ozone-modifying substances and the availability
of technological controls to limit future emissions in March 1986 and conference jointly
sponsored with UNEP in June 1986 concerning health and environmental effects of ozone
modification and climate change).
61. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Impact Statement on
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (Jan. 20, 1988) (pre-
pared under the Stratospheric Protection Program by the Office of Program Development
and the Office of Air and Radiation). See also 52 Fed. Reg. 29,110 (1987) (updated
notice by the Department of State and EPA of intent to prepare environmental impact
statement pursuant to National Environmental Policy Act and Executive Order No. 12,114);
49 Fed. Reg. 30,823 (1984) (notice of intent to prepare EIS).
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From the point of view of public participation, the negotiating history
of the Montreal Protocol contrasts significantly with that of another recent
instrument accompanied by a significant level of environmental concern-
the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFIA).2 According
to the only court that has reached the question, the NAFTA could signifi-
cantly and adversely affect the environment in the United States by, for
example, constraining domestic regulatory activity in such areas as pesti-
cide residue limitations.63
In giving notice of its intent to negotiate the NAFTA as specifically
required by law,' the Executive Branch announced public hearings on that
proposal in the Federal Register and solicited public comment on a variety
of specific issues, including the environment.61 During the NAFFA negotia-
tions, an environmental study of generic bilateral issues6 was prepared after
public hearings in six cities and an opportunity for public comment on a
draft of the document.
62. See NAFTA, supra note 10.
63. Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 27-29
(D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994)
(enumerating potential adverse environmental effects in concluding that plaintiffs have
standing to sue). See also The Role of Science in Adjudicating Trade Disputes Under the
North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Science,
Space, and Technology, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1992) (testimony of David A. Wirth);
Steve Charnovitz, NAFTA: An Analysis of Its Environmental Provisions, 23 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,067 (1993). "[Rlesolving questions pertaining to... unjustified
phytosanitary and sanitary restrictions," such as pesticide residue limitations, was one of
the principal trade negotiating objectives of the United States. Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901(bX7)(C) (1994).
64. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2153 (1994).
65. 56 Fed. Reg. 32,454 (1991) (notice of intent to negotiate North American Free
Trade Agreement). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 41,151 (1991) (updated notice of public hear-
ings); 56 Fed. Reg. 40,218 (1991) (same). Approximately a year later, the Executive
Branch proposed a worker adjustment program to ameliorate dislocations that might re-
sult from the agreement and solicited public comment on that program. 57 Fed. Reg.
31,533 (1992).
66. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REVIEW OF
U.S.-MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1992). The Clinton Administration released a
successor to this document to the public on November 13, 1993, a scant four days before
the House of Representatives voted on the NAFTA implementing legislation. THE NAFTA:
REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1993). The EPA and its Mexican counterpart pre-
pared a joint study of border issues, on which public hearings were held and public
comment solicited, that coincided temporally with the NAFTA negotiations. See U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency & Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia, Inte-
grated Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area (First Stage, 1992-1994)
Feb. 14, 1992. From the outset, however, this undertaking was expressly stated by the
Executive Branch to be on a separate, "parallel" track from the NAFTA negotiations and
in any event addressed only a subset of the environmental issues raised by that agree-
ment.
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As in the GATIT, however, nongovernmental observers were not per-
mitted to attend negotiating sessions. The Executive Branch did not release
interim texts of the NAFTA. Indeed, when a document purporting to be a
draft of the agreement was leaked to the press in late March 1992, the Ex-
ecutive Branch would neither confirm nor deny the authenticity of that
document.6 Although there was a dialogue with environmental organiza-
tions during the subsequent negotiation of the NAFTA environmental "side
agreement,"6 interim drafts of that instrument similarly were not released to
the public. Representative Richard Gephardt described the overall NAFTA
drafting process as "the most secretive trade negotiations that I have ever
monitored." 0
Moreover, in contrast to the ordinary procedure for Senate advice and
consent to ratification and enactment of statutes to assure the domestic ap-
plication of most treaties as provided in the Constitution, the adoption of
domestic implementing legislation for the NAFrA is subject to special "fast
track" procedures that limit Congress's power of amendment and that, as
applied in practice, have constricted public access to the post-negotiation
domestic legislative process necessary before the international obligations
in the agreement can be perfected.7' Under the fast track procedures, the text
67. As in the quasi-adjudicatory GAIT dispute settlement process described above,
only states as represented by their governments may participate in multilateral negotia-
tions in the GAT. The public generally does not have direct access to law making in the
GAT, either in the form of presence at negotiating sessions, such as the Uruguay Round
of Trade Negotiations, or public availability of interim negotiating drafts, such as the
recently adopted Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. See Rules of
Procedure for Sessions of the Contracting Parties, rules 8 & 9, reprinted in GAIT, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 10 (12th Supp. 1964) (limiting observers to
governments and intergovernmental organizations).
68. See Citizen Groups Say Leaked NAFTA Draft Would Undermine U.S. Stan-
dards, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Mar. 26,1992, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNA1TD
file.
69. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America, the Government of Canada, and the Government
of the United Mexican States, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1482 (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1994).
70. Remarks of House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt Before the 21st Century
Conference, Washington D.C. (Sept. 9, 1992), reprinted in Fed. News Serv., Sept. 9,
1992, available in LEXIS, Daybok Library, NEWS file.
71. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2903 (1994)
(authorizing "fast track" procedures found in 19 U.S.C. § 2191 for the NAFTA and GATT
Uruguay Round). The US has entered into most reciprocal trade agreements since the
original GAT as executive agreements authorized by prior statute. See, e.g., Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (1994) (authorizing negotia-
tion of trade agreements, including the NAFTA and GATT Uruguay Round);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 303 comment (e) & reporters' notes 8 & 9. Ordinarily,
such agreements can be expected to require the adoption of implementing legislation to
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of the trade agreement proper is publicly available before congressional
consideration of the domestic legislation for implementing that international
instrument. Congress can, and in the case of NAFTA did, hold publicly
accessible hearings on the agreement and, by implication, the legislation to
implement it as a domestic legal matter. Members of Congress had access
on a confidential basis to the draft bill and even participated in closed "non-
markups" and "non-conferences" before it was formally introduced.
Certain congressional committees, however, had preferential access to
this process. Moreover, the voluminous implementing legislation containing
a large number of modifications to domestic US laws was formally released
to the public less than two weeks before the House of Representatives voted
on the bill on November 17, 1993. Even then, this documentation was not
generally available as a practical matter until somewhat later.
Certain segments of the nongovernmental environmental community,
as distinct from the public generally, had preferential access to the NAFTA
negotiating process through membership on statutorily created private sec-
tor advisory committees to the United States Trade Representative. One
representative of a nongovernmental environmental organization was ap-
pointed to the forty-five member Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and
Negotiations. Four others were appointed to subsidiary policy advisory com-
mittees on such issues as investment, services, industry, and agriculture."2
Those individuals, along with one additional staffer for each that also had
access to interim texts, were subject to confidentiality restrictions autho-
rized by the statute creating those advisory committees.73 These confidentiality
agreements, among other things, prohibit the signatory from releasing the
text to the public or to other individuals within the organization. The subsid-
ensure their efficacy as domestic law and, in turn, to confirm that the US can meet its
international commitments. Questions have recently been raised concerning the constitu-
tionality under some circumstances of this process, which does not require the Senate's
advice and consent to ratification of the agreement by a two-thirds majority vote. See
Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Law, Harvard University, to Senator Robert
Byrd (July 19, 1994), reprinted in Inside U.S. Trade, July 22, 1994, at S-1 (arguing that
"the legal regime put in place by the Uruguay Round represents a structural rearrange-
ment of state-federal relations of the sort that requires ratification by two-thirds of the
Senate as a Treaty").
72. US President William Clinton established a new Trade and Environment Policy
Advisory Committee (TEPAC) by executive order on March 25, 1994. Exec. Ord. No.
12,905, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,733 (1994). The TEPAC is part of the larger private sector trade
advisory committee structure established by statute.
73. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2155(g)(3) (1994). The statutory language
requires that rules issued by the Executive Branch "shall, to the maximum extent fea-
sible, permit meaningful consultations by advisory committee members with persons
affected by" trade agreements.
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iary policy advisory committees are exempt by statute from specified statu-
tory requirements for open meetings, public notice, public participation,
and public availability of documents under certain circumstances."
V. CONCLUSION
There are at least five lines of cleavage in current practice with respect
to public participation in multilateral process on both the international and
domestic levels that are illuminated by these three case studies.
A. Variability in the Treatment of Nongovernmental Observers
by Intergovernmental Organizations
In the case of stratospheric ozone and many other negotiations under
UNEP auspices, nongovernmental observers representing both industry and
environmental organizations have been freely accredited as observers to for-
mal intergovernmental meetings, with the prerogative of speaking in formal
meetings and the entitlement freely to receive preparatory documentation.
By contrast, the presence of nongovernmental observers is categorically
precluded in trade negotiations in the GATT, such as the recently completed
Uruguay Round, and access to drafts of significant documents is consider-
ably more restricted. The OECD's advisory committee structure additionally
discriminates between representatives of nongovernmental environmental
organizations on the one hand and industry and labor representatives on the
other. The latter have a certain degree of preferential access through BIAC
and TUAC that environmental organizations do not. There appears to be no
generally accepted standard of practice among multilateral fora on this ques-
tion. Moreover, few intergovernmental organizations-even those such as
UNEP that have relatively liberal practices-have formal, written policies
or guidelines such as the United Nations Economic and Social Council's
formal system for interacting with non-governmental organizations awarded
consultative status with that body." By contrast, in the International Labor
Organization (ILO) members of the public-in that case workers' and em-
74. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(0(2) (Policy advisory committees are exempt from cer-
tain provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act "whenever and to the extent it is
determined by the President or his designee that such meetings will be concerned with
matters the disclosure of which would seriously compromise the development by the
United States Government of trade policy, priorities, negotiating objectives or bargaining
positions.").
75. A 1968 resolution establishes procedures for applying for and awarding con-
sultative status to accredited nongovernmental organizations, which are divided into two
principal categories and a "roster" of other organizations. E.S.C. Res. 1296, 44 U.N.
ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 21-22, U.N. Doc. E/4548 (1968). Depending on their classifica-
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ployers' organizations-are voting delegates to the annual International Labor
Conference. Under the ILO's tripartite structure, these nongovernmental
delegates are equal in total number to those representing governments. 6 As
a first step, the OECD Council might require its committees to report on the
extent to which nongovernmental organizations have been involved in their
work and to identify opportunities for greater involvement by the private
sector.
B. Absence of Standardization in Treatment of Documentation
by Intergovernmental Organizations
Mirroring the variability in their treatment of nongovernmental observ-
ers, multilateral fora display a wide variety of approaches with respect to
public access to their own documentation. For example, UNEP made no
attempt to limit access to interim negotiating drafts of the Montreal Proto-
col. Much of the background documentation produced as part of the
preparatory process leading up to the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development-the so-called "Earth Summit"-held in Rio de
Janeiro in June 1992 was made widely available in advance of that meeting
in electronic form. By contrast, the availability of OECD and GATI" docu-
mentation from the professional staff of those organizations is considerably
more restricted. International organizations themselves, and the United States
as a member of those organizations, should work to improve access to all
documents of all international organizations and to ensure that the vast ma-
jority of documentation is routinely made available to the public.
C. Disparate Treatment of Nongovernmental Sectors on the
International Level
The OECD's formal advisory committee system is a compelling exam-
ple of dissimilar approaches to representatives of different nongovernmental
sectors, namely industry and environmental groups. Discrimination among
nongovernmental sectors may have particularly pronounced effects on ac-
tion, organizations awarded consultative status may be entitled to send representatives to
meetings, to submit written statements to the Council, to make oral statements at meet-
ings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies, and to request inclusion of items on the
Council's provisional agenda. That resolution also establishes the rights of accredited
organizations with respect to such questions as speaking on the floor of meetings, circu-
lation of documents, and access to UN documentation. See generally R. SYBESMA-KNOL,
THE STATUS OF OBSERVERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS 295-318 (1981).
76. See Constitution of the International Labor Organization, Oct. 9, 1946, arts. 3
& 4, 62 Stat. 3485, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, amended, June 25, 1953, 7 U.S.T.
245, T.I.A.S. No. 3500, 191 U.N.T.S. 143, amended, June 22, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1039,
T.I.A.S. No. 5401, 466 U.N.T.S. 323, amended, June 22, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3253, T.I.A.S.
No. 7987.
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cess to the organization's documentation by private parties to the extent that
that documentation may not be available through domestic channels, as in
the case of the OECD's work on trade and environment. The need for either
clear and liberalized rules guaranteeing broad and direct public access to
OECD documentation or an advisory committee analogous to BIAC and
TUAC that services private environmental interests, or both, is increasingly
clear. Whether or not such a channel is established, both the OECD and the
US government should work to minimize or eliminate these unjustified dis-
parities in treatment of different sectors of the public.
D. Lack of Objective Standards for Public Participation in
Domestic Processes Relating to International Affairs
As demonstrated by the contrast between the domestic treatment of the
Montreal Protocol and NAFTA negotiations, procedures for public partici-
pation within the United States on issues of foreign policy vary widely. By
contrast with analogous quasi-legislative activities in a strictly domestic
context, there are no across-the-board, generally applicable standards re-
quired either by legislation or by internal Executive Branch policy. Instead,
public access is determined largely on a case by case, ad hoc basis that does
not necessarily acknowledge earlier precedents. A number of factors seem
to influence the choice of approach, including: (1) demand for access from
nongovernmental sectors; (2) the institutional culture of the Executive Branch
agencies involved; (3) the culture, history, and context of the international
setting in which the question of domestic access arises; and (4) the perceived
sensitivity of the subject matter. The Executive Branch should explicitly
address this question and regularize practice in this area through a vehicle
such as an executive order. Alternatively, as in the GATT Uruguay Round
implementing legislation,77 a legislative analogue of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act78 governing issues of foreign affairs might be considered.
E. Absence of Standards for Domestic Release of Documents
of International Organizations
Echoing the myriad approaches to this question on the international
level, the Executive Branch's approach to intergovernmental organization
documentation lacks uniformity. Indeed, as demonstrated in the case of the
OECD, Executive Branch agencies have treated documents from the same
international organization bearing the same "restricted" designation in en-
tirely different ways on different occasions. While the most desirable solution,
77. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
78. See APA, supra note 3.
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as discussed above, is greater public access on a multilateral basis, in the
meantime the State Department should develop a clear policy with respect
to this question on the strictly domestic level.
More generally, public participation in lawmaking functions, particu-
larly those that are carried out by unelected officials in settings like
administrative nile makings in the United States, furthers a number of im-
portant public policy goals. Citizen input in governmental decisionmaking
processes has been justified as facilitating accountability to the public.79
Similarly, public participation can assist informed, accurate, and efficacious
governmental decision making by providing pertinent information to public
authorities." And citizen participation can improve the efficiency of govern-
79. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Under
our system of government, the very legitimacy of general policymaking performed by
unelected administrators depends in no small part upon the openness, accessibility, and
amenability of these officials to the needs and ideas of the public from whom their ulti-
mate authority derives, and upon whom their commands must fall."); Arthur Earl Bonfield,
The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 316-18 (1986)
("[An administrative agency is not ordinarily a representative body, its deliberations are
not usually conducted in public, and its members are not subject to direct political con-
trols in the same way as legislators .... Broad citizen participation in the rulemaking
process is therefore an excellent check on agencies that are unresponsive to public needs.");
Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical Review, 14
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501, 546 (1989) (arguing that administrative process "should re-
flect democratic values and the intellectual contributions of democratic theory"
notwithstanding the public's lack of technical expertise); Wesley A. Magat & Christo-
pher A. Schroeder, Administrative Process Reform in a Discretionary Age: The Role of
Social Consequences, 1984 DUKE L.J. 301, 316-19; Robert B. Reich, Public Adminis-
tration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1637 (1985)
("The job of the public administrator is not merely to make decisions on the public's
behalf, but to help the public deliberate over the decisions that need to be made. Rather
than view debate and controversy as managerial failures that make policymaking and
implementation more difficult, the public administrator should see them as natural and
desirable aspects of the formation of public values, contributing to society's self-under-
standing.").
80. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 482
F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) (public participation in
rule making "opens up the process of agency policy innovation to a broad range of criti-
cism, advice and data"); Bonfield, supra note 79, at 316-17 ("An agency's accumulated
knowledge and expertise are rarely sufficient to provide all the needed data for rulemaking
decisions. Persons who are affected by agency actions are often in the best position to
provide much of the specific information necessary for wise rule formulation. An oppor-
tunity for interested persons to inform appropriate administrators of facts, views, or
arguments that they consider relevant to a proposed rule is, therefore, necessary for the
sound operation of government."); James T. Harrington & Barbara A. Frick, Opportuni-
ties for Public Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW.
537, 537-38 (1983) ("Administrative agencies actively solicit detailed, technical infor-
mation from the regulated community in recognition that it is impossible to draft
appropriate regulations in a factual vacuum .... [Ilt is not only a person's right, but his
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mental processes by reducing the long-term costs of official decision mak-
ing, particularly on controversial issues where public sentiment can be
assessed in advance of a policy choice.8' Requirements for notice-and-com-
ment rule making in the Administrative Procedure Act,82 generally applicable
to a variety of domestic US administrative processes, are intended to ensure
the responsiveness and efficacy of bureaucratic initiatives."3 Although the
details of the mechanisms obviously differ somewhat, other municipal legal
systems reflect similar underlying policies.8"
The need is just as great on the international level. Public participation
in the OECD Chemicals Group has been described as not just desirable but
necessary for realizing the goals of that entity. The Chemicals Group was
charged with achieving demonstrable results. At the time of the Group's
creation, much of the technical expertise with respect to chemicals resided
in the nongovernmental private sector, including both business and environ-
mental interests. Informing and mobilizing the environmental community in
the United States was essential as a political matter to create public support
at home for measures agreed to in the OECD. According to this view, public
participation in the OECD Chemicals Group has been a "win-win" proposi-
duty to provide agencies with ... hard technical data and scientific information on the
proposal and its economic effect."); Magat & Schroeder, supra note 79, at 317 ("Fairness
and accuracy are interrelated, because techniques for ensuring fairness-adequate notice
and the opportunity to participate meaningfully in proceedings affecting one's interests-
will also ensure accuracy.").
81. See, e.g., Magat & Schroeder, supra note 79, at 318 (defining efficiency as "the
low-cost resolution of the business" before the decisionmaker). But cf. Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation ofAdministrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (identifying par-
ticipation by a broader array of societal interests in administrative proceedings as a trend
that involves tradeoffs between accountability on the one hand and accuracy and effi-
ciency on the other).
82. See APA, supra note 3.
83. Administrative rule making has been described as" 'one of the greatest inven-
tions of modern government.' ... During coming decades, the prospect is that governments
all over the world will adopt American ideas about rulemaking as a mainstay of govern-
mental machinery." 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:1, at
448-49 (2d ed. 1978). See FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMrrrEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 102 (1941)
(rule making "should be adapted to giving adequate opportunity to all persons affected to
present their views, the facts within their knowledge, and the dangers and benefits of
alternative courses" and help decision makers obtain "the information, facts, and prob-
abilities which are necessary to fair and intelligent action"). See also H.R. REP. NO.
1980 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1195, 1205 (The APA's "public information section is basic, because it requires agencies
to take the initiative in informing the public)."
84. See generally PARTICIPATION AND LITIGATION RIGHTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSOCIATIONS IN EUROPE: CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
(Martin Ffihr & Gerhard Roller eds. 1991).
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tion, with the efforts of the governmental and private sectors reinforcing
each other to realize the Group's and the OECD's goals and purposes. Both
industry representatives and environmentalists can overcome obstacles to
communication and create an atmosphere of trust in this international con-
text in a way that is difficult to duplicate in domestic fora. Conversely, there
appear to be few, if any, situations in which greater public access and par-
ticipation has been a "lose-lose" proposition.
Distinctions should be made between those foreign policy domains-
such as war and national security-that are appropriate for the highest level
of secrecy at both the international and national levels and those-like envi-
ronment and trade-that are not. Even so, domestic models cannot be
incorporated into international decisionmaking processes without attention
to the foreign policy context. The rules of intergovernmental organizations
cannot be expected to be responsive to the national legal system of every
country on Earth. Even such strictly domestic processes as crafting US po-
sitions in multilateral fora require application of outcome-neutral principles
of public participation with sensitivity to a foreign policy setting. That does
not mean, however, that basic tenets of US public law as access to propos-
als for new policies and an opportunity for public comment must be
abandoned altogether. Even conceding the need for responsiveness to a vari-
ety of foreign policy settings, public participation on environmental issues
in international processes appears to be ad hoc in the extreme and would
benefit from attempts to regularize and standardize policy and practice to
improve both consistency and predictability.
One channel already exists on the domestic level for expanding public
participation in the negotiation of international agreements by the Executive
Branch. To ensure that all proposed international agreements are consistent
with US foreign policy objectives, the Department of State has adopted a
procedure known as "Circular 175."85 Pursuant to that process, the negotia-
tion and conclusion of virtually all international agreements requires the
prior approval of the Secretary of State or his designee. The State Depart-
ment in necessary cases oversees an interagency consultation to solicit the
views of interested and affected Executive Branch agencies. The request for
State Department approval is accompanied by a memorandum of law set-
ting out the constitutional and statutory authority supporting the proposed
agreement and identifies additional laws or regulations that may be neces-
sary for the agreement's domestic implementation.
85. 22 C.F.R. § 181.4 (1995); 11 F.A.M. ch. 700. According to informed anecdotal
accounts, no Circular 175 was prepared for the NAFTA environmental side agreement,
supra note 69, because of that instrument's political sensitivity.
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The Circular 175 process, as it stands now, is strictly an interagency
procedure. Draft requests for negotiating authority are not public. Although,
as in the case of stratospheric ozone depletion, there may be opportunities
for public participation in negotiations, there is no opportunity for direct
public input into the Circular 175 process itself. Depending on the subject
matter, Circular 175 requests may be classified. In any event, Circular 175
documentation is not customarily made available to the public. In response
to a request under the Freedom of Information Act, the State Department's
policy would very likely result in withholding that documentation as exempt
inter- or intra-agency memoranda.1
6
To improve public input into US negotiating positions, the Circular
175 process could be made more accessible to public comment. A notice of
intention to negotiate a new international agreement might be published in
the Federal Register, together with a statement of US objectives and a re-
quest for public comment to the US negotiators. Alternatively, either by
statute or on the Executive Branch's own initiative, outcome-neutral proce-
dures analogous to notice-and-comment rule making under the Administrative
Procedure Act might be established, with processes tailored to meet the needs
of governmental decision making in national, bilateral, and multilateral con-
texts. For instance, interim drafts of international agreements or other
significant actions in multilateral fora might be published in the Federal
Register, with a subsequent opportunity for formal public comment to US
negotiators. In either case, whether through the Circular 175 process or
through the adoption of free-standing arrangements for consultation with
the public, international actions that are especially sensitive for military or
security reasons could be subject to a modification or waiver of these re-
quirements.
An environmental impact statement (EIS) under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA)' is another vehicle for public participation in
governmental decisionmaking processes. For those federal activities antici-
pated to have a significant adverse impact on the environment, an EIS is
required in advance of final action. The Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), located, like the Office of the Trade Representative, in the Executive
Office of the president, is the chief caretaker of the statute. CEQ regulations
specifically state that proposed international agreements are subject to the
statute's requirements.88 The Department of State also has regulations that
86. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994); 22 C.F.R. §
171.11(a)(5) (1995).
87. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70
(1988).
88. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(1) (1995) (definition of major federal actions to which
NEPA applies, including "treaties and international conventions or agreements").
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apply NEPA and the EIS requirement to international agreements.89 In the
past, various Executive Branch agencies have prepared environmental im-
pact statements for proposed international agreements, such as the Panama
Canal Treaty. Overall, approximately a dozen international agreements have
been the subject of environmental impact statements, at least some of which
explicitly rely on NEPA as the legal authority for their preparation.? But
practice has been spotty, the standards for determining when an EIS should
be prepared have not been uniformly applied, and many of the agreements
subjected to the methodology have been intended to mitigate or eliminate
environmental harms-the category of least, rather than greatest, concern."
The EIS process is primarily designed to ensure that federal agencies
integrate environmental considerations into their decisionmaking processes
by analyzing potential environmental effects prior to taking action. Accord-
89. 22 C.F.R. § 161.5 (1995).
90. Besides the Panama Canal Treaty, for which the Department of State prepared
a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) in 1977, the Executive Branch has also
prepared the following final EISs in connection with the negotiation of the following
international agreements: Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer
(Department of State & Environmental Protection Agency, 1988); Interim Convention o
the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (Department of Commerce & Department of
State, 1985); U.S.-Canada Convention for the Conservation of the Migratory Caribou
and Their Environment (Department of State, 1980) (draft EIS); Incineration of Wastes
at Sea Under the 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention (Department of State & Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, 1979) Convention on the Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Department of State, 1979) (draft EIS); Renegotia-
tion of Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (Department of
Commerce, 1976); Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (Department of
State, 1974); Ratification of Proposed Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (Department of State, 1973); World Heritage
Convention (Department of Interior, 1973); and Negotiation of an International Regime
for Antarctic Mineral Resources (Department of State, undated).
91. In 1979 the president issued an executive order that articulates less demanding
requirements than NEPA for analyzing environmental effects of major federal actions
with effects abroad. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
app. § 4321 (1988). Post-1979 EISs have been undertaken pursuant to NEPA, the Execu-
tive Order, or both. The Executive Order, which expressly excludes from its coverage
"votes and other actions in international conferences and organizations," Id. § 2-5(a)(vi),
might limit the applicability of the EIS methodology in situations other than formal inter-
national agreements. A recent judicial decision, however, suggests that NEPA might
nonetheless apply in certain contexts. See generally International Decisions, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 626 (1993) (analysis of Executive Order in the context of Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). In another recent case, the US
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit held that there was no legal neces-
sity for the USTR to prepare an EIS for the negotiation of NAFTA or the adoption of that
agreement's implementing legislation. Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representa-
tive, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994). The reasoning of
that case, however, would not apply to most international agreements other than trade
agreements.
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ing to CEQ's regulations and a considerable body of case law, an EIS must
contain the following elements: (1) a description of the proposed action; (2)
an analysis of the potentially affected environment; (3) a description of the
direct and indirect potential impacts on that environment resulting from the
proposed action; (4) a consideration of alternatives, including the alterna-
tive of no action, and the potential impacts of those alternatives; and (5) an
analysis of mitigating measures. But the EIS process is also an occasion for
public information and public participation. CEQ rules ensure public par-
ticipation in the preparation of an EIS through, at a minimum, an opportunity
for public comment on a draft statement and the necessity for agencies to
respond to those comments in the final document.92 The availability ofjudi-
cial review of the procedural adequacy and substantive content of an EIS
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act93 has long been established.94
At a higher level of abstraction, these case studies suggest that rules
governing public participation in international arenas lack uniformity, are
arbitrarily applied, or both. This conclusion has important implications for
the integrity of democratic government. In particular, experience with pub-
lic participation in international processes suggests that those procedures
are not necessarily responsive to the concerns of a broad citizenry but, rather,
to those with the resources or expertise to gain access to policy makers of all
sorts-domestic, foreign, and the professional staff of international organi-
zations.
92. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(d) (1995) (statement of federal policy to
"[e]ncourage and facilitate public involvement in decisions which affect the quality of
the human environment"); Id. § 1501.7(a)(1) (necessity as part of scoping process to
"[ijnvite the participation of... interested persons (including those who might not be in
accord with the action on environmental grounds)"); Id. § 1503.1(a)(4) (necessity, with
respect to draft EIS, to "friequest comments from the public, affirmatively soliciting
comments from those persons or organizations who may be interested or affected"); Id. §
1506.6 (instructions to agencies requiring public involvement in the NEPA process); Exec.
Order No. 11,514 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 104 (1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. app. § 4321 (1988)
(directing federal agencies to "[dievelop procedures to ensure the fullest practicable pro-
vision of timely public information and understanding of Federal plans and programs
with environmental impact in order to obtain the views of interested parties"); Colony
Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 296, 304 (W.D. Pa. 1980) ('Citizen participa-
tion is a vital ingredient in the success of NEPA.... An opportunity for local citizens or
other interested parties to participate in the preparation of the environmental analysis is
mandatory under NEPA."); Burkey v. Ellis, 483 F. Supp. 897, 915 (N.D. Ala. 1979)
("[NEPA] and the CEQ Guidelines promulgated under it are designed to encourage pub-
lic participation in the decision-making process.").
93. APA, supra note 3, §§ 701-706.
94. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Policy making increasingly seems to be shifting to international fora.
Distance, resources, language facility, and familiarity with international
procedures can all operate as barriers to international venues whose post-
Cold War importance is increasing in such areas as population, trade, labor,
public health, and the environment. If rules of access act as an additional
barrier, the risk that policy makers in international settings will respond to a
narrower, rather than broader, array of interests is greatly increased. And to
the extent that international institutions are vehicles for domestic policy
making in the first instance, principles of access that are restrictive or un-
evenly applied may in turn have an impact on the legitimacy of government
at the national level.
